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Abstract 
The paper uses two historical examples, public health (1840-1880) and town planning (1945-
1975) in Britain, to analyse the challenges faced by goal-driven research, an increasingly important 
trend in science policy, as exemplified by the prominence of calls for addressing Grand 
Challenges. Two key points are argued. (1) Given that the aim of research addressing social or 
global problems is to contribute to improving things, this research should include all the steps 
necessary to bring science and technology to fruition. This need is captured by the idea of practical 
integration, which brings this type of research under the umbrella of collective practical reason rather 
than under the aegis of science. Achieving practical integration is difficult for many reasons: the 
complexity of social needs, the plurality of values at stake, the limitation of our knowledge, the 
elusive nature of the skills needed to deal with uncertainty, incomplete information and 
asymmetries of power. Nevertheless, drawing from the lessons of the case studies, it is argued 
that (2) practical integration needs a proper balance between values, institutions and knowledge: 
i.e. a combination of mutual support and mutual limitation. Pursuing such a balance provides a 
flexible strategy for approximating practical integration. 
  
 
 
Research for policy-making and practical action  
is inevitably conducted in a political context. 
If research is to be ‘useful’  
it must relate to the art of the possible 
(Pahl 1975, p. 5) 
 
the stakes here are not to make sciences ‘progress’, 
but to raise to the challenges facing society 
(Stengers 2002, p. 98) 
 
 
Grand Challenges are increasingly shaping research policy, its funding 
schemes and priorities. This is nowhere more apparent than in the biomedical 
and biological sciences, since ‘society’s need for the results of biological 
research has never been greater’ (Losos et al, 2013, p. 1). The medical sciences 
have a long tradition of mediating between pursuing scientific understanding 
and putting it into practice, i.e. caring for the health of patients. Medicine has 
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a dual image of an art and a science, and is indeed a discipline whose mission 
is as much to make patients’ care grounded in sound scientific knowledge as 
to make clinical research conducive to better diagnoses, therapies and 
prevention. The biological sciences have surely not been without relations 
with practice, for instance in farming, husbandry, pharmacology and food 
production, but only in the last decades this practical vocation has taken a 
whole new dimension.1 The transformation is taking place at different levels: 
the life sciences themselves are being transformed by new approaches like 
integrative biology and systems biology; biotechnologies and bioindustry are 
attracting unprecedented investments and attention; the social and cultural 
impact of life sciences and biotechnologies are stimulating a growing amount 
of research in the humanities and the social sciences, so that that bioethics and 
biopolitics have become familiar concepts2.  
 
The biological and biomedical sciences have thus a special interest in Grand 
Challenges: they are ideally positioned to produce research that has profound 
impact on urgent problems; but they are also facing risks, for promising 
impact without being able to deliver effective results can backfire quite 
seriously. It is therefore necessary to understand how to play the game, 
because what they are called to do is not just science.3 This paper attempts to 
provide some ideas and perspectives that can help: 1) researchers in 
understanding what to expect when participating in Grand Challenges and 
what to consider when planning their strategies; 2) scholars interested in 
some current transformations in the practice of science. 
  
In the first section of this paper I argue that this trend calls for a broad 
concept of integration that, besides making possible collaboration across 
disciplines, enables knowledge to issue into viable action. This brings us into 
the domain of practical reason, hence the label practical integration. This idea 
stresses that engaging in research aimed at tackling the problems of society 
requires a methodological and epistemological shift from the focus on validity 
                                                        
1 Some interesting examples of the relations between agriculture and biology are explored in a 
special issue on biology and agriculture published in 2006 in the Journal of the History of Biology. 
The papers highlight that the relation has by no means been one of linear application of biological 
discoveries to agricultural practices.  
2 On the transformation of biology and its increasing social relevance see Palsson 2000; National 
Research Council 2009; Robinson et al 2010;  Wake, 2008; Losos et al 2013; on the growing 
importance of biotechnologies and on the growth of biotech industry see Rifkin, 1999; Venter & 
Cohen, 2004; Dyson, 2007; and Rasmussen, 2014. 
3 As a reviewer of the collection of essays A New Century of Biology cogently put it: ‘a major 
challenge for biologists in the new century is to define an effective strategy for integrating the 
biological sciences with global economics and human social structure’ (Bernardello, 2002, p. 
235). 
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characteristic of academic disciplines to an orientation towards relevance and 
effectiveness, towards what can work here and now in promoting well-being.  
  
Achieving practical integration cannot be a matter of following a strict 
method or procedure: on the contrary it requires flexibility, imagination and 
ongoing learning. Thus I propose a heuristic perspective that is flexible, but 
sufficient to focus attention and efforts on the key factors of practical 
integration: values, institutions and knowledge. This perspective is illustrated 
through two case studies (two ante litteram Grand Challenges) that occupy 
sections 2 and 3 of the paper: Public Health in Victorian Britain, and Town 
Planning in post WWII Britain. These examples show how important it is to 
reach an ecological balance between values, institutions and knowledge: i.e. a 
dynamic balance through which each dimension both feeds and limits the 
others. They are also a good reminder—as I explain in the conclusion—of the 
need to be humble and realistic in our aims: rather than solving problems, our 
best hope is to build our ability to cope with them and to react and readjust to 
changing circumstances. 
 
1. Grand Challenges as collective practical reason 
 
1.1. The coming of Grand Challenges 
 
Grand Challenges are becoming an increasingly fashionable concept in 
science policy (Lund Declaration, 2009; Jones, 2010; Calvert, 2013; Efstathiou, 
this issue). While the concept is vague and has been used in different ways 
(Brooks et al., 2009), its growing popularity is arguably due to its linking 
research priorities and important social goals (Jones, 2010; Calvert, 2013). 
Grand Challenges (henceforth GCs) are emerging as a banner to promote 
scientific research and technological innovation that contribute to tackle 
problems of great social relevance and to promote human well-being. GCs 
can thus be used as a broad blanket term to indicate all efforts to use and 
mobilise scientific and technological research to address serious challenges 
that are very relevant for society (cf. the notion of ‘grand in scope challenges’, 
Efstathiou, this issue). GCs are an upshot of ‘the public’s increasingly insistent 
demand that publicly funded research and education clearly show their 
connections to community needs’ (Frodeman et al., 2001, s.p.): a demand that 
has fuelled the rise of mission-oriented science and transdisciplinarity. GCs 
are typically large and ambitious projects with time-horizon of more than one 
decade (cf. EPSRC, 2014, p. 4). Examples of issues that are the object of GCs 
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are climate change, sustainable cities, clear water supply, antibiotic resistance 
(cf. IET, 2013)—all problems that require the contribution of the life sciences. 
 
The aim of GCs calls is not just to describe and understand these issues: it is to 
deploy science and technology to make things better.4 Grand Challenges can 
therefore be seen as an interesting case of collective practical reason, for 
‘[p]ractical reason aims at action that succeeds in furthering human well-
being’ (Kekes, 2010, p. 3). Responses to GCs can be described in the same 
way: aiming at promoting human well-being through successful action, where 
success is understood in terms of effectiveness, not in terms of efficacy. Thinking 
in terms of practical reason helps us in having clear that we are in a domain 
different from pure science with its methods and standards: we are instead in 
a domain akin to politics and its ‘logic’.5  
 
By looking at GCs as collective practical reason we can see integration not 
only as an attempt to enable the knowledge and methods of different 
disciplines to work together, but also as the need to bring together knowledge 
and praxis. I call this integration of research and of collective action practical 
integration to distinguish it from the more familiar epistemic integration.6 
While epistemic integration aims at making possible for different scientific 
disciplines, theories and methods to work together coherently, practical 
                                                        
4 In order to be useful the concept of GCs need to be separated from an optimistic faith in 
technical solutions and silver bullets that, according to Brooks and colleagues (2009), often 
accompanies them. Nothing prevents from using the notion of GCs in association with a much 
more modest idiom that articulates the task in terms of problem-coping (cf. Funtowicz & Ravetz, 
1993, p. 99) and tackling challenges (cf. Brown et al., 2010).  
5 Daniel Sarewitz (1996, especially chaps. 8 and 9) has compellingly argued that dogmatic faith in 
scientific and technological solutions has become a surrogate for social action and misdirected 
social efforts. I agree with his analysis and I do not believe that GCs are in themselves a 
solution—they may even reinforce this trend. My hope is that if we can foster an understanding 
of GCs according to which their criteria of success need to be external to science, then we can 
escape the false and dangerous myths chastised by Sarewitz. 
6 I use the expression ‘epistemic integration’ to denote the prevailing concern of the literature on 
interdisciplinary integration: namely ‘to overcome the conceptual and methodological 
boundaries between the prevailing fields of research’ (Huutoniemi et al., 2010, p. 81). This kind 
of integration is at the core of influential understandings of interdisciplinarity. According to the 
often quoted report of the U.S. Committee on Facilitating Interdisciplinary Research  for instance, 
‘Interdisciplinary research (IDR) is a mode of research by teams or individuals that integrates 
information, data, techniques, tools, perspectives, concepts, and/or theories from two or more 
disciplines or bodies of specialized knowledge’ (National Research Council, 2004, p. 2). The 
centrality of the epistemic and cognitive dimension of integration is common in the literature on 
interdisciplinarity (see for instance Miller et al., 2008; Wagner et al., 2011; Green & 
Wolkenhauer, 2012; Defila & Di Giulio, 2015; Brister, this issue). While institutional and 
communicative aspects are often examined too (see for instance National Research Council, 
2004, Chs. 4-5; Gerson, 2013; O’Rourke & Crowley, 2013), integration is primarily an 
epistemic/cognitive concept. 
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integration aims at successful action in actual given circumstances.7 Practical 
integration includes all the information, evaluations, planning and 
implementation routines that turn techno-scientific knowledge first into 
actionable knowledge or usable technical artefacts, and then enable these 
latter to become part of workable interventions and established practices, 
from which in turn new knowledge is gained. Collective practical reason is 
thus wider than governance. In philosophy practical reason is traditionally 
seen as reasoning that issues in action. Accordingly, practical integration aims 
at targeting techno-scientific knowledge to the circumstances of action: i.e. to 
the constraints and affordances of contexts of action that are shaped by 
‘structured contingencies’ (Rosenberg, 2006, p. 20).  
 
1.2. What is it that we try to bring together through the process of practical 
integration? 
 
In the context of GCs practical reason is constituted by techno-scientific 
expertise and instrumental rationality as well as by a combination of other 
intellectual skills, which in practice work in combination and are 
fundamentally interdependent, but for ease of exposition I analyse these 
separately. First there is local knowledge, which consists of acquaintance 
with the ‘context of application’ and the ‘context of implications’ respectively 
(Nowotny, Scott and Gibbons 2001). I call it knowledge although it seldom 
satisfies strict epistemic standards. The subject of local knowledge is the 
behaviour of local systems—including social, cultural, economic, natural and 
technical systems—and the interactions within and among them. Its sources 
are mainly firsthand experience and the need to operate within and across 
them. Social sciences and history can valuably contribute to this 
understanding, but they can never give the full picture. Equally valuable is 
the knowledge dispersed among stakeholders. Some of it is implicit, 
inarticulate and practical: it will only emerge ex post. Furthermore what is 
important and what is noise changes as circumstances evolve and according 
to our agenda. Local knowledge is always a transient synthesis drawn from a 
                                                        
7 My distinction between epistemic and practical integration is similar to Jahn and colleagues’ 
distinction between integration in interdisciplinarity and transdisciplinarity (Jahn et al., 2012, p. 
2). However I see two advantages in making the distinction in terms of epistemic and practical 
integration. The first reason is to avoid that disagreement—which still exists—about the 
understanding of transdisciplinarity casts confusion on the nature of the distinction. The second 
reason is that the notion of practical integration makes much clearer how large and important is 
the gap between these two types of integration and that while epistemic integration is subsumed 
under practical integration its epistemic standards cannot apply to practical integration.   
  
 6 
 
large, incomplete, opaque and shifting repository of potential information—
i.e. the actual life and environment of particular people and groups. 
 
Second, there is what I call (loosely following Aristotle)8 phronesis, by which I 
mean the ability to perceive values and to make wise value judgements. Here 
I use ‘values’ as a broad concept covering ideals, principles, goals, practices 
that matter to people and give meaning to their activities and choices. 
Phronesis requires a set of skills: the breadth of imagination and sympathy 
that enable to see, understand and appreciate values that are not our own; the 
ability to weigh their relative importance. This latter includes both the ability 
to see what the perceived weight of a value is and the ability to influence and 
improve people’s evaluations, i.e. to understand which evaluations can be 
changed and how. Finally it requires the wisdom to arrange things so as to 
make it possible to achieve, promote and honour as many values as possible. 
Typically in the context of GCs and collective action, we are concerned with 
the values and ethos of groups rather than individuals. Failure to understand 
them and to address and appease their concerns is going to breed conflict, 
hostility and mistrust and undermine the prospects of effective action.  
 
Third there is what I call (following Detienne & Vernant 1974, and Scott 1998) 
metis, which is the ability to make good judgements and decisions when 
confronting situations that are unique, fluid, uncertain and untypical. It is a 
combination of foresight, flexibility, resourcefulness and cunning. It requires 
apt cognitive frameworks (discrimination), a reliable moral compass (a sense 
of what is important), and timely decision making. We can thus see metis both 
as a specific skill and as a unifying moment in the working of practical reason. 
Metis can be described as ‘the power of integrating or synthesising the 
fleeting, broken, infinitely various wisps and fragments that make up life at 
any level’, and which leads to ‘a sense of what will “work”, and what will not’ 
(Berlin, 1996, p. 47). It is the ability to read the circumstances and understand 
what they afford. In tackling a GC it is the ability to solve the conundrum 
produced by the previous forms of knowledge and skills:  
● given the scientific knowledge and technological resources available,  
● given the particular context in which we operate, with its resources, 
constraints, history and trends,  
● given the values of the various stakeholders and the levers (incentives 
and disincentives) available to effect some shifts or changes, 
                                                        
8 Aristotle discusses phronesis in book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics. It is a notoriously difficult 
book and interpretive controversies and disagreement abound. My use of phronesis does not 
claim to be an accurate interpretation of the Aristotelian concept.  
 7 
 
 which strategy and which immediate moves are most likely to bring us 
  closer to achieving our goal? 
 
Different choices in researchers’ life can provide a rough illustrations of the 
range of knowledge and skills that go into practical integration: writing a 
paper for a peer reviewed journal requires epistemic knowledge; deciding 
whether a different department or research unit will provide a better working 
environment requires local knowledge; deciding whether to accept the job 
offer from a university in a foreign country requires phronesis (balancing 
professional and family interests); leading a research group that achieves high 
reputation and attracts an ongoing stream of funding requires metis.  
 
Compared to phronesis, metis operates where not only there are conflicting 
values and uncertainty, but there are unjust power relations, iniquitous 
motives, unreasonable positions and stubbornness as well. Smart responses to 
such circumstances are not necessarily ethical—Odysseus, the paragon of 
metis, is not a paragon of morality.  
  
I have described phronesis and metis as personal qualities or virtues because it 
is easier to grasp them as personal characteristics. However, the practical 
integration needed for GCs is typically not a matter of integrating personal 
skills in one person or in a small group; it is more a question of smart 
organisational engineering. Practical integration is a matter of weaving 
together networks and of devising decision procedures as well as evaluating 
and learning mechanisms that will enact the collective and distributed version 
of practical reason. Ultimately what is important for the success of collective 
practical reason is to have a social-organisational process that embodies 
various types of knowledge, evaluative capacities and executive skills. Clearly 
this is a regulative ideal that we can only approximate, not least because it is 
indeterminate: we know that we want a process that leads to the most 
effective feasible action, but what this latter is cannot be determined or 
known. Nor can our goals and ideals be known in advance, ‘[s]ince learning 
aims to educate our preferences in the light of our possibilities, what we do 
and what we seek evolve together’ (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984, p. xvii; cf. 
Dewey, 1988, chs. 8 and 23). In aiming at actions that are effective and viable 
in the actual world, practical integration brings science and technology into a 
domain—untamed reality—that we cannot appraise and manipulate 
according to strict epistemic standards. With practical reason and practical 
integration we are operating in a domain of which there is no scientific 
knowledge—there is only scientific knowledge of some sub-domains under 
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controlled circumstances, not of the whole domain in its actual circumstances 
(cf. Sarewitz, 2010).  
So what can be achieved in uncontrolled reality is beyond our knowledge and 
practical integration is an indeterminate ideal. This might sound 
disappointing, but it should not. If we do not make any ungrounded 
metaphysical assumption about the nature of the world and our ability to 
fully and systematically understand it, we must accept that in trying to 
improve our lot we are tinkering with a reality that escapes our full 
understanding (cf. Dupré, 1996, p. 117) and with possibilities not yet 
disclosed. This is a healthy and constructive form of scepticism, one that 
urges us to get rid of the delusions that prevent us from acknowledging the 
real magnitude of the challenges we face, and that invites us to look for 
modest and pragmatic approaches. Finally, it reminds us that the epistemic 
credentials of goal-driven research projects are not those of their contributing 
scientific disciplines, but those of their implementation machinery, i.e. those 
of governance, administration and marketing.  
 
1.3. How can we approximate practical integration? 
 
There are further reasons why practical integration is an elusive ideal: a) its 
highly contextual nature, b) the open and plural nature of phronesis, and c) the 
very nature of metis—which begins precisely where general and formalised 
knowledge and rationality end. Context-responsiveness, imagination and 
judgements are difficult to achieve following standardised procedures and 
methods. Therefore the approach to practical integration that I propose is 
simply a heuristic perspective focused on the interactions between Values, 
Institutions and Knowledge, henceforth VIK perspective (see figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: The VIK perspective (or VIK triangle)  
 
The VIK perspective can be used for analysing and interpreting cases of 
practical integration or of failures to achieve it—as I do in my case studies. 
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But it is also offered as a practical and prudential compass that points the 
attention to three dimensions that are crucial in the successful exercise of 
practical reason. Its practical value is based on the hypothesis that successful 
social action depends on a working balance between the power of Values, 
Institutions and Knowledge: on their feeding and limiting each other so that 
an ecological balance is maintained.  
 
Values, knowledge and institutions are broad categories: so let me explain 
how I use them. Under values I include all goals, aspirations and ideals that 
are endorsed and/or acted upon by some actors. They are perceived values, 
not necessarily justified values. In my discussion and case studies mostly 
ideals, goals and interests are grouped under the label of values. One last 
remark is very important: the category of values denotes a set that is 
populated by many tokens that are neither consistent nor necessarily 
compatible, so it is assumed that conflicts of values are ubiquitous: they are 
the norm, but they are troublesome nonetheless. I use the term knowledge to 
indicate not only these articulate, systematic, academic forms of knowledge, 
but I also include local and implicit knowledge, skills and know-how. Under 
institutions I include both what sociologists call institutions and what they call 
organizations, so both the economic market and a particular firm are 
institutions, both religion and a specific parish. Branches of the public 
administration and NGOs, clubs and societies, well established traditions and 
cultural conventions are all included.  
 
Now we can better see why the VIK triangle is a usefully simple and flexible 
tool: by focusing on its three components we are forced to make use and 
combine the knowledges and capacities illustrated in the previous section. 
The plurality of values urges us to make them explicit, understand their 
sphere(s) of pertinence and weigh them against each other in specific 
contexts. Looking at existing institutions forces us to acquire local knowledge 
and reveals implicit and taken for granted values. Designing or adapting 
organizations for implementing our plans engages our imagination and metis. 
Knowledge points our attention to the need for acquiring reliable and 
relevant scientific and local knowledge. Finally, instrumental reasoning and 
deliberation about ends need to work together. Trying to balance the three 
dimensions of the VIK triangle is thus an indirect strategy for achieving 
practical integration; a strategy that can inspire both the architecture of the 
network involved in a GC and the actions of individuals within the network. 
For instance it can inspire the construction of more inclusive networks, more 
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open communication channels, and make individuals more aware of systemic 
interdependencies. 
 
1.4. What is distinctive about Practical Integration and the VIK framework? 
 
The notion of practical integration presents some similarities and affinities 
with existing ideas, approaches, methods. Readers will have noticed affinities 
with post-normal science (Functowicz & Ravetz, 1993), with Mode 2 
knowledge production (Gibbons et al., 1994; Nowotny et al., 2001 and 2003), 
with action research (Argyris et al., 1985), with some understandings of 
transdisciplinarity (Bammer, 2012; Brown et al., 2010; Hirsh Hadorn et al., 
2010; Mitchell et al., 2015), with philosophical pragmatism (Dewey, 2004; 
Kitcher, 2012; Rorty, 1999), with positions that are critical towards scientistic 
and reductionistic understandings of rationality and method (Toulmin, 2001; 
Flyvbjerg, 1993 and 2001; Scott, 1998). The concept closer to practical 
integration is that of ‘translational integration’ proposed by Sabina Leonelli 
(2013, see in particular pp. 510-2).9 However, I want to point out what is 
distinctive about the approach I advocate and why I introduce new labels. 
 
As anticipated in footnote 2, the concept of practical integration stresses that 
integration for goal-driven research occupies a logical space very different 
from that of epistemic integration typical of ‘academic’ research. While this 
latter is governed by epistemological criteria of validity—e.g. surviving 
experimental testing or critical peer scrutiny—practical integration is 
governed by pragmatic criteria of incremental improvement: a solution has to 
be viable, reasonably expected to produce more good than harm, cost-
effective, reversible and improvable, promoting the creation of capabilities 
and of ongoing learning (cf. Scott, 1998, ch. 10; Stirling, 2010; Mitchell et al., 
2015). These criteria are hard to reduce to formalized methods and clearly 
imbued with a variety of social values. Compared to post-normal science, 
Mode 2 knowledge production, and Swiss-German style transdisciplinarity10, 
practical integration brings together science and political action but not under 
the idea of science. Instead it stresses that it is science that, so to speak, is a 
guest in the house of collective decisions, not politics which is granted 
                                                        
9 I am indebted to O'Rourke, Crowley and Gonnerman (this issue, fn 22) for calling my attention 
to Leonelli’s paper. She applies her concept of translational integration to a much narrower 
domain (plant science) and she does not develop it in great details, nevertheless the affinity with 
practical integration is such that the example she uses—the recruitement of scientists and 
stakeholders in the attempt to tackle the infestation of Phytophtora ramorum in the UK—can be 
used as effectively as an example of practical integration.    
10 See Klein (2010, p. 25). 
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citizenship into science. Practical integration is thus immune from two 
common criticisms addressed to theorists of transdisciplinarity: 1) of 
generating an ‘anomalous’ idea of science that confusingly merges ‘strict 
science and political action’ (Alvargonzález, 2011, p. 400); 2) of reclaiming the 
prestige of science for enterprises in which sciences provide inputs, but 
cannot validate the outcomes (cf. Alvargonzález, 2011, pp. 398-9; Dupré, 1996, 
p. 116)—e.g. when the plurality of scientific perspectives is reduced to a single 
view to simplify decision making  (Stirling, 2010).  
 
In my use, collective practical reason is a hybrid as compared to the 
traditional categories of science and politics, and even in relation to the less 
pure categories of, say, applied science, administrative and implementation 
studies, or applied ethics. It is not an attempt to bring science and technology 
under the authority of ethics or democratic politics. It is rather an attempt to 
acknowledge that reasoning about ends cannot be disentangled from talking 
about means, and that talking about means sensibly requires engaging the 
expertise coming both from technoscience and from administration and 
management—including communication and marketing. Engaging expertise 
has to be taken literally: expertise is not to be taken at face value, but has to 
put itself on the line, expose itself to new challenges and new learning. So 
compared to pure science and to ethical or political theory, collective practical 
reason is about achieving goals in given circumstances and determining goals 
in light of the required and available means—and this means facing some 
ugly choices and even dealing with evil. It demands both from sciences and 
from ethics that in their practical use they take account of political realism 
and practical necessities, but it does not aim at limiting sciences and ethics to 
their practical uses: we need both the ‘pure’ and the streetwise versions of 
them11. 
 
Practical integration can be usefully compared to two works with which it has 
many common features and goals. Tackling Wicked Problems through the 
Transdisciplinary Imagination (Brown et al., 2010) aims at providing tools and 
inspiration to researchers engaged in transdisciplinary goal-driven projects. It 
thus shares with practical integration the concern for helping in having an 
impact and making a difference. Furthermore, the emphasis on the 
importance of the imagination provides another strong affinity. Not only 
imagination is a key element of both phronesis and metis, but it also highlights 
                                                        
11 I do not mean to suggest that ‘pure’ science is independent from external influences. There is a 
large literature on the relation between science and politics and between knowledge and power, 
but this topic is beyond the scope of the present analysis.  
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the value of ways of thinking and doing typical of the arts and humanities. 
Finally this work emphasizes the importance of using a variety of methods 
and approaches: a pluralistic stance shared by practical integration.12 Yet, in 
spite of these important commonalities, Tackling Wicked Problems often 
remains hooked to the prevailing epistemological understanding of 
integration. For instance in the introduction the authors first stress that 
wicked problems require changes in society, as well as different and more 
imaginative decision making, but then in describing diversity they fall back to 
a purely epistemological account of it. Transdisciplinarity is described as the 
‘collective understanding of an issue’, which includes ‘all validated 
constructions of knowledge and their worldviews and methods of inquiry’ (p. 
4). The problem facing the increasingly close collaboration between 
researchers and decision-makers is thus described as that of ‘bringing 
together people with radically different understandings of the world’ (p. 5, 
emphasis mine)—rather than mentioning differences in interests, values, 
power, voice. This reduction of the issue of pluralism and diversity to a 
basically epistemological problem—apparent also in chapter 4, where five 
different knowledge cultures that need to be brought together are identified—
does not reflect the spirit of the book, rather it reveals that the discourse on 
integration has been captured by the epistemological idiom (on capture see 
Brister, this issue). The concept of practical integration could have enabled 
them to provide a fuller account of what needs to be integrated besides 
knowledge (i.e. values and institutions, which are often discussed in the book) 
and of the capabilities needed for such broader integration (e.g. phronesis, 
metis). 
 
The second example comes from comparing practical integration with the 
idea of ‘Integration and Implementation Sciences’ (I2S) proposed by Gabriele 
Bammer (2012). The affinities are several and important: the focus on real-
world problem, the ambition to help policy makers and promote changes in 
practice, the emphasis on the importance of stakeholders’ and practitioners’ 
knowledge, the attention to implementation, the impossibility of avoiding 
unknowns and the necessary imperfection of every solution. The main 
difference is that practical integration expresses a sceptical stance towards 
Bammer’s hope to establish a quite structured new discipline under the label 
of Integration and Implementation Sciences, and especially towards the belief 
that this requires a ‘“Big Science”-type project’ (Bammer, 2012, p. 6). A 
                                                        
12 Practical integration does not share the holistic stance though: pluralism brings with it a 
diversity that should not be ignored (here I follow Dupré, 1996; Stirling, 2010; Sarewitz, 2010, as 
well as the tradition of ethical pluralism inspired by Isaiah Berlin). 
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network favouring communication and exchange of ideas among practical 
projects is surely extremely useful, but the idea that this could be driven by a 
top-down Big Science project seems both unrealistic and ill-suited to 
accommodate the importance of the local and the pattern of development of 
digital networks. Public intervention and funding should encourage and 
support the development of the infrastructure, tools and capabilities, but the 
process should be demand-driven, bottom-up. Finally, because of the 
indeterminate, imagination- and judgment-based nature of practical 
integration, I would describe integration and implementation as arts rather 
than as sciences. To summarize, practical integration can fit with Bammer’s 
concept of ‘integrative applied research’ (Bammer, 2012, p. 18), but remains 
sceptical on the more ambitious idea of Integration and Implementation 
Sciences, especially if conceived as Big Science. 
  
Let me wrap up the key points. Practical integration does not claim to 
discover something new, but to give a name to an aspiration implicit in some 
of the literature on transdisciplinarity. As Roderick Lawrence points out, 
‘there clearly is a growing number of authors who challenge interpretations of 
transdisciplinary research that do not address broader social and political 
dimensions that ought to be integrated in the research agenda’ (Lawrence, 
2015, p. 8). Practical integration is not hostile towards epistemic integration: it 
simply encompasses this latter within a broader integrative task, which is 
both epistemically fuzzier and of a higher order. The polemical intention is 
not against the importance of epistemic integration, but against the hegemony of 
the epistemological idiom when thinking about integration. This hegemony is 
harmful for several reasons: 
● it makes it hard to acknowledge the role of idiographic and quasi-
aesthetic concepts in practical integration; 
● it makes epistemic robustness rather than relevance to human well-
being the focus of goal-directed research—thus failing to appreciate the 
difference between fundamental research and practical research; 
● it encourages the inflation of science—watering down its specificity—
and a rhetorical use of the words ‘science’ and ‘scientific’. 
The concept of practical integration tries to avoid these mistakes, while the 
VIK perspective offers an easy-to-grasp and flexible guide to practical 
integration.  
 
In the following two sections I discuss two case studies—two ante litteram 
examples of Grand Challenges—that show the heuristic value of the VIK 
perspective and provide evidence in support of the hypothesis that an 
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ecologic balance between Values, Institutions and Knowledge is needed. They 
are examples of both individual and collective practical reason at work, 
although it does not always work as it should. The notions of local 
knowledge, phronesis and metis help in understanding what worked and what 
did not. 
 
 
2. Public Health in early Victorian Britain  
 
The transformations triggered by the combination of demographic growth 
and mass urbanization in 19th Century Britain generated extremely unhealthy 
living conditions in large parts of the cities (cf. MacDonagh, 1977, pp. 133-5; 
Wohl, 1983: chs. 1-5). Tackling those unsanitary conditions was an obvious 
case of ante litteram Grand Challenge. 
  
The problem was huge, from the 1830s awareness kept growing and a highly 
motivated group of sanitary campaigners tried to stir public authorities into 
action. This lobbying effort is an early example of integrating cross-
disciplinary knowledge and ethical motives. Table 1 below summarizes some 
key features of the circumstances in which sanitary campaigners operated13. 
  
                                                        
13 Cf. MacDonagh (1977, ch. 1). 
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Table 1: Obstacles and opportunities for government involvement in public health 
 
 
Circumstances hindering public 
intervention 
Circumstances favouring public 
intervention 
Values and beliefs 
Powerful and politically well represented vested 
interests of those who stood to lose by the 
introduction of public health measures (e.g. 
slum-lords, water companies, noxious trades and 
industries etc.). 
 
Doctrine of ‘philosophical necessity’—humans 
should not interfere with the natural course of 
things. 
  
Doctrine of laissez-faire in economics. 
 
Aversion towards increased taxation. 
 
Sanctity of home and family—more generally 
defence of traditional English liberties—
individualism. 
  
Fear of creating dependence and of undermining 
rational prudence. 
Humanitarian and socially reformist zeal 
exemplified by Evangelicalism and 
Utilitarianism. 
 
Momentous economic and demographic 
transformations called for governmental 
action and new responsibilities. 
 
Growth of interest in social statistics. 
 
Fear of social turmoil (especially around 
1848). 
 
Fear of epidemics (especially cholera). 
 
Fear of degeneration (physical and moral). 
 
Growing belief in a connection between 
cleanliness and morality. 
Institutions and politics 
At the beginning of the Victorian age, 
government had very limited tasks, 
responsibilities and resources (both human and 
financial). 
 
Very small—yet growing—administrative 
structure and expertise. 
 
Strong resistance against administrative 
rationalization and centralization. 
 
Extremely fragmented and un-coordinated 
nature of local bodies 
The 1832 reform bill gave more power to 
the emerging urban bourgeois and middle 
classes. 
  
Growth of knowledge-informed 
government: Parliamentary and Royal 
commissions and inquiries. 
 
Growth of local activism and civic pride. 
Knowledge and science 
Limited medical knowledge—medicine had still 
very limited diagnostic and therapeutic 
power—and poor social status of medicine 
The miasmatic theory of disease provided a 
basis for promoting hygiene. 
 
Slow emergence of scientific medicine (lab-
based) and of a more reputable medical 
profession. 
 
Advances in civil engineering (e.g. improved 
sewers, WC toilets etc.). 
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In order to succeed in stimulating effective action for the promotion of public 
health, its promoters needed to weave together the values, knowledge and 
institutions that could provide support for it and find a way to appease some 
of those pitched against them. How was this done? How successfully?  
The traditional account of the history of public health tells a success story: 
although it took several decades, had to overcome many challenges and 
temporary setbacks, eventually by the end of the Victorian age the aims of the 
sanitary reformers had been achieved and public health had established itself 
as an important branch of public administration, a respected profession and 
academic discipline. The stories of three key figures in early Victorian public 
health provide a telling illustration of the importance of taking into 
considerations values, institutions and knowledge and of balancing them. 
Here we are going to follow three important figures: 
● Edwin Chadwick a Benthamite lawyer of formidable energy and a key 
figure in British public administration,  
● John Simon a brilliant pathologist who became the first Medical 
Officer of Health for the city of London and later the leading figure in 
public health at national level,  
● William Farr a physician who became the driving force of the newly 
established General Registrar Office and one of the most respected 
statisticians of his time.  
The first story exemplifies an initial remarkable success followed by an 
equally noteworthy setback, while the latter two show how through metis and 
the ability to integrate values, institutions and knowledge, balancing their 
demands and seizing opportunities lasting progress was achieved.   
 
2.1. Edwin Chadwick: success and failure 
  
Chadwick led the first sustained attempt to realize a bold public health 
programme in Britain. The attempt succeeded in bringing public health into 
the public awareness and policy agenda. Chadwick can be credited for some 
important legislative and institutional achievements—most notably the Public 
Health Act 1848 and the establishment of the General Board of Health. But 
ultimately Chadwick failed, was forced to resign (in 1854), and his 
programme was superseded by a new and different approach to public health 
(that of John Simon described below). It has become a commonplace to blame 
Chadwick’s authoritarian, dogmatic and inflexible character for the failure of 
his programme. There is a good deal of truth in this explanation; however we 
can gain further insights by looking at how he handled values, institutions 
and knowledge. Chadwick had a powerful intuition when he realized that 
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moral outrage at appalling urban living conditions and excess mortality could 
be supported by an economic argument showing that removing 
environmental causes of disease would have prevented much poverty and 
saved taxpayers money. The sanitarian programme of cleaning cities and 
removing filth could thus satisfy humanitarian feelings and taxpayers’ 
interests, without interfering with the labour market and incentives to work. 
This was a powerful and effective way of deploying a plurality of intensely 
felt values in support of public health interventions—a remarkable success in 
achieving integration within the domain of values.  
 
On the side of knowledge, the miasmatic theory of disease supported 
Chadwick’s environmental approach to health. More importantly and 
originally, he understood the potential of social statistics (mortality data) in 
backing his case, and of civil engineering (improved sewers design) in 
providing technical solutions. Nevertheless there were some weaknesses: his 
use of statistics and of evidence was rigged and far from impartial. The most 
alert critics like the young statistician F.G.P. Neison compellingly exposed the 
flaws (Cullen, 1975, p. 60; Hamlin, 1996). While this was not a serious blow to 
his case, in the long run his closed and instrumental attitude to knowledge 
would have also come to a head. Chadwick was interested in knowledge and 
science only as long as they were expedient for the achievement of his own 
goals and plans: once he had found some backing he showed no interest in 
promoting further knowledge or in learning lessons from rapidly developing 
sciences. His stubborn opposition to germ theory is a good case in point.  
 
While Chadwick’s attitude to knowledge was flawed and could not be 
sustained in the long run, it was his badly misjudged attitude in handling 
some key institutions that caused his failure. His implementation strategy 
was rational and consistent in theory, but misapprehended what was possible 
in the administrative and cultural environment in which he was operating. 
His vision of  ‘strong executive bodies, appointed rather than elected and 
furnished with authority and money from central government to undertake 
the massive task of sanitary reform’ (Halliday, 2011, p. 131) rubbed against 
too many interests and sensibilities. He ‘misjudged the ferocity of opposition 
to his hope to centralize control of public health policy and activity’ (Bynum, 
1994, p. 78). Vested interests and local authorities could not stomach the 
prospect of such dictatorial powers above them, and public opinion equally 
dreaded the breach of traditional British liberties and of the sanctity of home 
and private property. He became the object of widespread hatred and of 
violent attacks in the press, as shown by two striking quotations from The 
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Times: ‘We prefer to take our chances with Cholera and the rest than be 
bullied into health’ (quoted in Rosen, 1993, p. 200); ‘The truth is, we do not 
like paternal governments … This is another reason why the 
CHADWICKIAN sanitary regime so signally failed’ (quoted in Bynum, 1994, 
p. 78). The other great strategic error was Chadwick’s inability to win the 
support of the professional category that had more to gain from the 
consolidation of public health: the medical profession. His determination to 
look only for administrative and engineering solutions precluded the 
possibility of winning the support of doctors (Novak, 1973, Lambert, 1963, pp. 
62-3). In the end his attempt to achieve his goals through imposing his views 
against strenuous opposition costed him his career:  
 
At the early age of 54, he was forced to give up an active career in public 
administration, and while he was able to see the realization of many of his 
ideas in the course of his life, he took no active part in their development 
(Rosen, 1993, p. 200). 
 
In sum, Chadwick had a great insight on how to bring apparently conflicting 
values to support public health; he was also shrewd in the use of knowledge 
and in turning it into a rhetorical weapon and must be credited for having a 
prescient vision of the importance of having efficient administrative 
organizations. But he failed to give proper weight to knowledge (especially 
local) with the result of overlooking some values and staking all its chances 
on an administrative design that could not be accepted by existing institutions 
and feelings. He was able to see which means would have been necessary to 
achieve his goals, but unable to adapt his ends to the means actually 
available. He was incapable to feedback inputs into his comprehensive but 
doctrinaire project, to see the difference between theoretical plans and 
practical strategies developed within existing constraints and affordances. 
Looking only at the aspects of reality that supported and confirmed his 
vision, Chadwick blinded himself to the chance of learning from the struggles 
of the implementation process.  
 
As a perceptive contemporary put it, the Board of Health [under Chadwick] 
‘was steadily guided by the assumption that all needful sanitary knowledge 
had been conclusively attained and administrative action followed as a 
matter of course’. Hence its self-confident impetuosity, its ‘scientific one-
sidedness’, and its failure ‘to distinguish between opinion and knowledge’ 
(Lambert, 1963, p. 266; cf. Wohl, 1983, p. 153).  
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Chadwick egregiously failed to integrate fundamental local knowledge and 
practical experience in his vision. His system lacked the feedback channels 
that could have enabled his plan to be constantly updated through new 
scientific knowledge and politico-administrative experience. There was no 
balance in the VIK triangle, there was no practical learning. 
 
2.4. Farr and Simon: two success stories 
 
William Farr and John Simon managed to achieve greater and longer lasting 
results and the VIK perspective helps us in understanding why they 
performed better than Chadwick. Farr’s main achievement was to lead (from 
1839 to 1880) the freshly created General Registrar Office (henceforth GRO) to 
become an agency capable of succeeding in two important tasks: 
1. supplying the sanitary movement with the statistics they needed to 
support their case and stir authorities into action; and 
2. contributing valuably to the progress of statistical techniques and 
supplying data of high scientific value. 
From the VIK perspective the GRO under Farr’s guidance was inspired by the 
powerful combination of humanitarian and economic values already at work 
in Chadwick, but rather than subordinating knowledge to its practical goals, 
it managed to advance both. Regarding institutions, it was able to adapt to 
circumstances: to stimulate the creation of the needed administrative 
structures, but also to exploit the opportunities that the current situation 
afforded. Furthermore feedback channels enabled practical learning.  
A key feature in the GRO’s success in practical integration was what Simon 
Szreter has called his ‘twin pronged publication strategy to maximize both its 
political and scientific impact’ (Szreter, 2005, p. 242; cf. Cullen, 1975, pp. 40-1). 
The practical impact was achieved through the constant and timely 
production of Weekly and Quarterly Reports and Annual Summaries. These 
publications had to be timely in order to monitor changes in population 
health and implement remedial actions. They were aimed both at local 
authorities and doctors and at the public opinion—so that it could stir 
authorities into action. The information provided in these reports thus needed 
to be clear and easy to use.  
 
The scientific impact instead was achieved through the publication of the 
Annual Reports—not to be confused with the Annual Summaries—that 
provided much more extensive and rigorous analysis but were published 
with a delay of up to 4 years. Even more scientifically thorough and 
ambitious were the monumental decennial Supplements associated with the 
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national census. These documents were aimed at a specialist audience and 
were scientifically much more rigorous and thorough. (Eyler, 1979, pp. 141-2; 
Szreter, 2005, pp. 245-6).  
 
If we look at the evolution of the communication strategy we can appreciate 
that Farr and the GRO were responsive to the changing character of their 
audience. At first, Farr’s strategy was primarily aimed at ‘“converting” an ill-
informed general public’ (Szreter, 2005, p. 262). But in time things changed: an 
expert and organized professional group of public health practitioners slowly 
grew, and later bacteriology emerged and discredited the miasmatic theory. 
As a result the most effective audience to target was now a much more 
professional and scientifically minded one; furthermore statistics were no 
longer the key instrument of prevention: new standards of precision and 
specificity were now demanded. As a consequence the GRO reoriented its 
dissemination strategy towards the production of more accurate and more 
specific statistics, so that in the decades after Farr, the shift from a 
predominantly popularizing to predominantly scientific style was completed 
(Szreter, 2005, pp. 261-3).  
 
Farr understood that local authorities would have resisted an invasive role of 
central government and would have not waived their traditional 
prerogatives. Accordingly he accepted the idea that public health would be 
entrusted to local authorities. Soon he managed to put a local value—local 
pride—in the service of the cause of public health. He decided to publish 
comparative tables of mortality—with the intention of pushing into action the 
towns with the higher mortality rates—a clever way of playing with local 
shame and pride. Then he realized that his objective would have been served 
even better by publishing the mortality rates in the form of competitive 
league tables. Later, he understood that the most effective ideal and 
benchmark of achievable health results was the notion of Healthy Districts, 
i.e. he used the districts with the lowest mortality rates as benchmarks of 
what was achievable and for calculating how many lives could be saved. This 
was an ‘ingenious rhetorical invention’ (Szreter, 2005, p. 247) but also an 
extremely useful scientific model. It had three great merits: 1) it could be 
presented as a concrete and achievable standard—since it was actually 
achieved by the better faring districts—not an abstract model proposing a 
hypothetical target, therefore it was hard to dismiss for local authorities; 2) it 
was a dynamic and self-adjusting model that would have kept raising the bar 
as health conditions improved; 3) it enabled the calculation of the avoidable 
mortality for each district, thus providing a very vivid illustration of what 
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was at stake and what was the price of inaction. This example of metis shows 
graphically how attention to institutions, values and knowledge could enable 
setting realistic ends and choosing effective means. 
 
The GRO also offers an interesting example of how practical goals determined 
by considerations of value and by administrative capabilities were 
incorporated into knowledge production. The example comes from two 
classification systems used by the GRO in collecting and organizing data. 
Both the taxonomy of causes of death and that of occupations were shaped by 
the practical need of avoiding preventable deaths. As Szreter notices, ‘the 
concept of preventability … entails implied claims, regarding first the 
presumed efficacy of available remedial measures, and, second, the existence 
of a responsible executive agency, willing to undertake such preventive 
measures’ (Szreter, 2005, p. 257). So we see both practical goals and 
organizations’ capacities affecting knowledge production: what kinds of data 
and statistics were interesting and useful was partly determined by a) what 
was considered politically and administratively feasible, and b) the available 
preventive measures backed by the medical knowledge of the time (see 
Szreter, 2005 and Eyler, 1979, pp. 52-60 for a discussion of Farr’s nosology and 
its evolution).  
 
The pursuit of practical impact introduces elements of contingency into 
knowledge. The occupational taxonomy shows this clearly: Higgs (1991) 
argues that the criteria used for the GRO’s occupational statistics make them 
suitable only for the purpose of public health and criticizes colleagues who 
have used them in economic history14. The attempt to balance the claims of 
practical goals, epistemic standards and institutional feasibility implies some 
trade-offs and we need to be aware of the need to consider which 
assumptions and criteria have been incorporated in the knowledge we use. 
Practical knowledge that has grip on reality is not fit for all theoretical or 
practical purposes.  
 
An even more striking example of metis in achieving practical integration is 
offered by the career of John Simon. He should be credited for at least two 
major achievements in the process of consolidation of English public health:  
                                                        
14 Occupational groups were constructed around the kind of material things (or lack thereof) 
they were working with and the environment where they were working. For instance ‘clerks in 
law practices were placed amongst the professions but clerks in iron works were placed in the 
industrial orders under iron manufacture’ (Higgs 1991, p. 474). 
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1. as Medical Officer of Health (henceforth MOH) for the City of London 
in the years 1848-55 he was such an inspirational example that he 
contributed decisively to defining the role of the MOH as a central 
figure of public health at local level; 
2. through his vision, scientific reputation and administrative talent 
during his years (1855-71) at the Privy Council he managed to edify an 
efficient national system of public health staffed by increasingly 
professionalized personnel, supported by—and supporting—steadily 
growing medical knowledge.  
These achievements depended largely on his ability to integrate and balance 
values, knowledge and institutions. In particular he succeeded in setting in 
motion cycles of growth in which administrative expansion and knowledge 
production fed each other. He used existing administrative structures and 
powers to collect the evidence needed to advocate necessary reforms. But 
through this very process, and the meticulous preventive activity, his 
administrative agencies built the capabilities and experience that endowed 
them with the know-how required to carry out new tasks and expanded 
responsibilities. 
 
Simon was adaptable to circumstances and able to understand which 
advances were possible at each stage and which available steps would have 
contributed to the eventual overcoming of the present strictures. He thus 
developed a modus operandi that can be described as pragmatic 
incrementalism with a vision—an ambitious and evolving vision. As Lambert 
explains, he had  
 
A conception of sanitary administration not as the passive application of 
fixed knowledge and rigid formulae, but rather as itself a perpetual 
experiment, continually discovering, rejecting defining and revising 
knowledge and methods of execution in the effort to attain the paramount 
end: the extinction of all preventable disease (Lambert, 1963, p. 168).  
 
Unlike Chadwick, he understood that prevailing opinion, dominating 
interests and deeply rooted conventions and traditions could not be 
confronted head-on, that often one had to make the most of unfavourable 
circumstances or bad deals and work patiently in order to be prepared to 
seize the opportunity when circumstances would change and turn more 
auspicious. He explained that his experience working for local authorities 
‘had taught me lessons I could not otherwise have learnt, as to factors which 
in this country are essential to social progress’ (quoted in Lambert, 1963, p. 
237). These included respect for long established institutions and for the 
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opinion and feelings of the people and its representatives: there was no use in 
running ahead; a gradual process of education was the only way of achieving 
success. To this educational work Simon contributed with remarkable success 
through his skilful reports: documents so successful in blending authoritative 
expertise, tireless exposure of evils and eloquent exhortations, that they were 
routinely published by the most influential newspapers. 
 
Simon was particularly successful in using inquiries to expose the real nature 
and scale of unsanitary living conditions as well as the limits of current 
knowledge. Inquiries brought to the light enough knowledge to make a case 
for prompt action, but at the same time stressed the need to have more and 
better knowledge. Awareness of limits fuelled efforts to overcome these 
limits. This grounded a balanced, dynamic and expansive model of 
integration in which the three dimensions reinforced each other. To be sure, 
successful and inspiring as this model looks, it was not immune from some 
questionable features. For instance, one may wonder whether integration of 
science and policy went too far and whether boundaries were blurred. 
‘Simon’s office and the professional pressure groups were barely 
distinguishable in personnel and policy’ (Lambert 1963, p. 302). The 
admirable humanitarian and scientific goals, as well as Simon’s personal 
integrity and prudence may well have masked the risks inherent in this 
strategy of merging advocacy and research, of using knowledge as a form of 
soft power in the hands of the central public health administration. Yet the 
system largely worked well and was flexible enough to keep growing and 
evolving. 
 
My point is not to idealize Farr’s GRO and Simon’s state medicine, but to see 
at work models of practical integration that, without being perfect, achieved 
the kind of balance that allowed knowledge and institutions to grow and to 
provide workable and evolving resources to cope with important social 
problems. Now it is time to turn to another historical example, one where 
promising circumstances were not sufficient to achieve the hoped for results. 
Poor practical integration got in the way.  
 
 
3. Post-war British Town Planning 
 
In this section I look at British town planning in the three decades after the 
war, a period that saw first the sudden rise of town planning and then its 
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profound crisis. My analysis covers the period from the Second World War to 
the early 1970s.  
 
3.1. The rise 
 
Like public health, town planning was an answer to the major social problems 
stemming from massive and unregulated urbanization. But it made slower 
progress into public administration and public conscience. Things were 
moving in the late 1930s, but it was the war that provided the turning point 
and the springboard for planning’s take off. While huge problems inherited 
from the Victorian age were still largely unresolved, the destructions caused 
by German bombing sounded a call for action and provided an opportunity 
for reconstruction (Grindrod, 2013, pp. 21-2, 105-110). Even more decisive was 
the psychological and political change effected by the war: ‘The Second World 
War convinced the British public of the need for planning: economic 
planning, military planning, social planning, town and country planning’ 
(Meller, 1997, p. 67; cf. Cherry, 1996, p. 105 and Glass, 1973, p. 50). Already 
during the war activity was intense: four official reports on issues related to 
planning and five different plans for London appeared (Meller, 1997, p. 67; 
Cherry, 1996, p. 101-6). Pressure groups, led by the Town and Country 
Planning Association, were lobbying actively and planning ideals and 
infrastructures made decisive inroads into public administration: in 1943 a 
Ministry of Town and Country Planning was set up; unprecedented powers 
were conferred to planning by the 1944 Town and Country Planning Act. The 
same year a White Paper, The Control of Land Use, envisaged the most 
comprehensive and ambitious vision of planning yet proposed. The 
remarkable momentum of town planning continued under the Labour 
governments in the years up to 1951. Gordon Cherry summarises very 
effectively the consolidation of town planning as a staple concern of local 
governance: 
 
It is impossible to underestimate the importance of the period 1945-51 in the 
twentieth century history of town and country planning. It was in these years 
that the hopes of pre-war enthusiasts were met, and when a Cinderella 
profession was propelled into post-war reality with legislative backing and a 
statutory system within which to act. The period was a bridge, almost 
literally, in the middle of the century, between two very different experiences: 
previously town planning had been largely a matter for enthusiastic 
amateurs, a handful of consultants, and the pressure of a garden city lobby; 
afterwards it became institutionalized and the concern of bureaucrats and 
 25 
 
professionals in the corridors of local government power (Cherry, 1996, p. 
131).  
 
This ‘golden age’ of British planning (Batty, 1979; Meller, 1997, ch. 5; Taylor, 
1998, ch. 3) was supported by a coalition including the political leadership 
(the coalition government during the war and the labour cabinet afterwards), 
the advocates of planning, civil servants, and the population willing to ‘build 
a better Britain’ after the hardships of the economic depression of the 1930s 
and of the war. 
  
The profession that took advantage of these promising circumstances had 
recently formed the Town Planning Institute, providing itself with a 
governing body that determined the education criteria and acted as 
gatekeeper. Born out of the initiative of architects, surveyors and civil 
engineers15 the profession developed a rather narrow technical character. In 
spite of the anarchist and utopian origins of town planning, politics and 
broader social vision were renounced in favour of technical expertise and the 
naïve assumption of a spontaneous harmony with social and economic 
planning. According to Nigel Taylor, the profession 1) saw itself as concerned 
with the planning of the physical built environment, not with social, political 
or economic planning; 2) was performed essentially as ‘an “extension” of 
architectural design’ (Taylor, 1998, loc. 154); 3) its main point was the 
production of ‘master’ plans or detailed blueprints. The heritage of 
utopianism survived in the focus on the final result and disregard of the 
practical means: ‘nowhere is found a discussion of implementation or 
updating’ (Hall, 2002, p. 356; cf. Glass, 1973, p. 55-6). 
 
The profession thus had become much less interdisciplinary than some of its 
founding fathers—e.g. Patrick Geddes—had envisaged. The post-war cultural 
climate contributed to foster the illusion that broad consensus and unity of 
intents obtained around social goals and people’s needs. The goals and values 
of planning were thus assumed to be a matter of common sense, neither 
needing special social scientific knowledge nor ethical justification.  
Contingent sociological reasons contributed to the lack of a social scientific 
component in town planning. Economists had enough employment 
opportunities in a civil service that was rapidly expanding and was 
increasingly involved in managing the economy. Sociologists had 
disappeared from Britain in the years between the First World War and the 
                                                        
15 Hall (2002, p. 354); see also Cherry (1996, p. 132); Foley (1960, p. 214) who, in addition, 
acknowledges a minor role to lawyers, economists and geographers. 
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1950s (Soffer, 1982, p. 768). Geographers got more involved, but focused on 
drawing maps and thus contributed to the narrow design-oriented character 
of the discipline (Crone, 1964, pp. 211-3). 
 
3.2. Crisis 
 
Starting from the 1950s town planning faced increasingly exacting challenges: 
both practical and theoretical. This was not an exclusively British 
phenomenon, indeed the turbulence manifested slightly earlier in the United 
States, and while the social and practical causes, as well as the institutional 
circumstances, had significant differences, the theoretical challenges were 
common and travelled across the Atlantic very fast. But let us look first at the 
social causes.  
 
Post-war British planning had assumed a remarkably static social and 
economic world, with little economic and social growth, little internal 
migration and foreign immigration. Further it had assumed an effective state 
control over economic life, industrial development and redevelopment—that 
would have also controlled the distribution of the population so as to make it 
more even—and most importantly public control and funding of urban 
reconstruction and renewal. From the 1950s these assumptions began to fall 
like a row of dominoes. The baby boom brought about unexpected 
demographic growth and demand for more housing; the shift towards 
smaller households compounded the problem; the economic boom produced 
expectations of higher standards of living and especially an increased 
demand of such land-hungry goods as houses and cars; the mass diffusion of 
automobiles put enormous pressure on road traffic. Classes and poverty 
refused to disappear, together with urban decay and speculations. Moreover 
the unexpected flow of immigrants from the former colonies brought 
renewed attention to problems of urban poverty and segregation, 
complicated by new issues of interracial relations and racism. The sense of 
unity and the postwar consensus were rapidly eroding. Building and new 
housing were increasingly provided by private developers and hence much 
less amenable to planning control and public goals. Internal migration 
continued and the economy progressively shook off public control (See Hall, 
1985; Cullingworth, 1994). The result was that the achievement of post-war 
goals was seriously incomplete, while planners began to feel frustrated and 
disappointed, ill-equipped and powerless in a fast changing and uncertain 
world and that the public grew disillusioned and voiced harsh criticisms—for 
instance through the influential voices of the architect Ian Nairn and the poet 
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John Betjemann (cf. Cherry, 1974; Tewdwr-Jones, 1999). Planners’ role 
‘changed from one where they were seldom challenged, to one that was 
undermined from without and within’ (Ravetz, 1986, p. 121).  
 
Other disciplines contributed to shake planners’ certainties. Developments in 
computer science and cybernetics led to the emergence of computational 
models and system theory. Before long, economists applied these techniques 
to the study of traffic flows, and then inspired system planning that came to 
dominate in the 1960s and then declined. However, system planning radically 
changed the practice of planning and in particular laid to rest the idea that the 
main task of planners was to produce a blueprint of land use in the form of a 
master plan. Advances in management suggested that a more 
multidisciplinary approach was necessary to address decision-making and 
planning in open and complex systems. At the same time political scientists 
and policy analysts were stressing both the plurality of interests and values in 
society and inescapable frictions, negotiations and compromises that 
characterize the formulation and implementation of policies. Sociologists 
showed that urban renewal had broken communities rather than building 
them. All the assumptions of post-war planning were falling apart. 
From the 1960 the profession experienced a profound identity crisis: planners 
were no longer confident in their methods, knowledge and role16.  
Perhaps the most dramatic—if a bit overstated—account of the profound 
transformation that occurred is provided by Michael Batty: 
 
Prior to about 1960 … planning was an expertise akin to a craft: its 
knowledge base was personal and its process was implicit, acquired by 
experience and thus highly professionalized. Its problems were easy to define 
and its solutions were equally easy to engender. But the increasing 
uncertainty and complexity manifest in society had a profound effect. The 
golden age of stability and certainty disappeared almost overnight. The 
discipline of physical planning changed more in 10 years from 1960 to 1970, 
than in the previous 100, possibly even 1000 years. Once the threshold from 
the certain, simple world of the past to the uncertain, complex world of the 
present was passed, the discipline experienced a change of quite 
revolutionary proportions which is clearly manifest in its process, its 
methodology (Batty, 1979, p. 18). 
                                                        
16 The crisis is clearly evident in the literature of the 1960s and 1970s. See for instance Glass 
(1973); Jacobs (1993); Davidoff (1965); Bolan (1967); Gans (1968); Pahl (1975); Rittel and 
Webber (1973); Friedmann & Hudson (1974); Galloway & Mahayni (1977). Historical accounts 
are also in agreement about the crisis although they point out that theoretical crisis and external 
criticism went together with a new wave of planning activism. See Cherry (1974 and 1996); 
Ravetz (1986); Taylor (1998); Hall (2002). 
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Planners were busy trying to find scientifically valid methods for planning 
and socially acceptable justification for the work and practice of town 
planning departments. From being an activity that enjoyed broad political 
and popular support, planning had turned to be an activity that was 
scientifically and politically suspect, and subject to public vilification. The 
ethics and the epistemology of planning were under scrutiny and planners 
were nervous about the robustness of their credentials.  
 
3.2.1. The VIK interpretation of the crisis of planning 
 
At first it may seem quite obvious that town planning as it emerged in post-
war Britain had solid institutional entrenchment, but serious deficiencies in its 
knowledge and values bases. As Ruth Glass realized already in 1959, 
 
By virtue of becoming an established institution and an established 
profession respectively, both [the planning system and the profession] have 
acquired vested interests in maintaining themselves unchanged… .Neither 
the institution nor the profession has those built-in controls of scepticism 
which make it possible to remain young. Altogether, planning has become 
respectable far too easily and far too quickly (Glass, 1973, p. 52). 
 
This remains a remarkable insight, but needs further articulation. The VKI 
perspective suggests a more detailed analysis, according to which post-war 
planning suffered from a serious failure of integration at two different levels.  
1. The coalition that promoted the rise of town planning was too narrow 
in each of the three dimensions (values, knowledge and institutions).  
2. The illusion of independence and of possessing enough regulative and 
executive power obscured the need to integrate with other actors and 
agencies. This illusion of self-sufficiency along the three dimensions of 
power prevented town planning from pursuing practical learning and 
broader coalition building. Flexibility and evolving capacity were not 
built.  
Let me briefly expand on these points. 
 
3.2.2. Institutional entrenchment without integration 
 
While town planning became rooted in governmental administration, its 
integration with other administrative branches proved too weak, in particular 
economic and industrial planning failed to support as expected the town 
planning effort. Even more serious was the imperfect distribution of 
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responsibilities and resources at the level of local government. It soon became 
clear that effective town planning in the changing circumstances that were 
emerging could only take place at the level of the city region, for cities kept 
growing at their fringes, especially beyond the green belt, and hence beyond 
the boundaries of the local government power. There was therefore a problem 
of lack of correspondence between the area that should be the subject of town 
planning and the local government administrative divisions. The division 
between cities and their hinterlands ‘made effective planning of entire urban 
regions a virtual impossibility’ (Hall, 1985, p. 158). This structural problem 
remained unsolved even after the 1972 Local Government Act.  
In sum, the institutionalisation of planning was successful to the extent that it 
made town planning part and parcel of British governmental policy and local 
administration. But the institutionalisation of town planning was deficient in 
terms of creating an administrative framework that was flexible enough to 
adapt to change and that was well tailored to operate at the right scale to 
effectively govern urban transformation—‘powers of implementation were 
lacking’ (Ravetz, 1986, p. 89). 
  
3.2.3. Values opacity and conflict evasion 
 
The role of values in post-war planning is difficult to pin down. Positive 
values and evils to be removed were part of the rhetoric of planners: cities 
should be healthier, provide better housing and more amenities; 
overcrowding, sprawling and unregulated development needed to be 
avoided. These were common claims and did not meet with many objections. 
The problem is that relying on such platitudinous values provided an excuse 
for evading any serious and thorough discussion. Taking values as 
uncontroversial and as object of consensus became itself a normative 
assumption (Taylor, 1998, ch. 2), which furthered some of planners’ self-
serving purposes. On the one hand, as Foley (1960) points out, it allowed a 
sort of ideological opportunism, or ‘adaptive mechanism’ needed to win the 
support of both political sides. On the other hand, it fostered the deceptive 
(and self-deceived) view that planners were simply technical experts in the 
service of a ‘“unitary” view of the common interest’ (Taylor, 1998, loc. 471). 
Hence the political dimension of planning was denied. Both Foley and Taylor 
note that 1) the mission and ideals of planning were heterogeneous and not 
easy to reconcile; 2) there were no conscious efforts to make the goals and 
values of planning explicit (see also Hall, 1985, p. 280 and Cherry, 1996, p. 
146). Avoiding explicit and systematic discussions of values allowed planners 
to evade a difficult issue, but it came at a price. First, turning a blind eye to 
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conflicts of values and interests among stakeholders blocked a vital channel of 
information and understanding of social reality. Second, planners failed to 
develop the capabilities to handle conflicts of values. Using intuition and 
personal judgment proved quite indefensible when planning came under 
criticism, for it lacked transparency and justification. Avoiding any explicit 
and deep discussion of values prevented planners from seeing the storm 
approaching and to develop one key skill for dealing with it. 
 
3.3.4. Knowledge without learning 
 
This is the dimension that better exemplifies the shortcomings of planning. A 
common thread in the criticisms of planners that were emerging in the 1960s 
was the accusation that they had a poor understanding of urban realities and 
dynamics (Jacobs, 1993). ‘What planners lacked, and what planning theory 
had failed to provide, was an adequate empirical understanding of the world 
they were seeking to manipulate’ (Taylor 1998, loc. 798). Planners assumed 
that the knowledge needed was available, through a mixture of borrowing 
and synthesizing freely from other disciplines, personal expertise and 
observation. Survey-analysis-planning was the three-step method inspired by 
Geddes. It was a ‘one-shot’ process: continuous learning, updating and 
implementation were not part of planning method or practice (Hall, 2002, pp. 
356-7). ‘The process was assumed to be able to generate the best plan directly 
and the idea that the best might not be discovered in a straightforward 
manner, was never broached’ (Batty, 1979, p. 31). But as planning results 
came under attack, it became clear that the level of complexity and 
uncertainty of the urban environment had been grossly underestimated. More 
knowledge was needed, but what kind of knowledge exactly was a matter for 
debate. More realistic goals needed to be pursued, but which goals exactly 
was a matter for controversy. System planning revolutionised methods and 
shifted attention from the end result to the process of planning. But by 1973, 
Douglass Lee’s influential article ‘Requiem for Large Scale Models’ 
sanctioned the declining fortune of system planning. The suspicion that the 
task of town planning was daunting and almost superhuman was mounting. 
Two articles published in Policy Sciences in 1973 (by Rittel and Webber, and 
Wildavsky respectively) epitomize the reasons for distrusting claims to 
provide technical solutions to complex social problems, which Rittel and 
Webber memorably described as ‘wicked’. Once the hope in a comprehensive 
understanding of the problems faced by planners was lost, a new trend 
emerged that saw planning as an on-going process of social learning and 
acknowledged that the urban, social and physical environment talked back to 
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the planning process. The urban system was finally seen as neither closed nor 
passive. This implied a much humbler estimate of achievable goals. The 
experience of the post-war grand challenge of improving urban life through 
the transformation of its physical layout ultimately led to a radical reappraisal 
of what could be expected from town planning: 
 
Planning through learning about the appropriate ways to link knowledge to 
action and vice versa represents the only response, a response difficult to 
accept for a society wedded to the concept of the definitive solution but one 
which is inevitable” (Batty, 1979, p. 44). 
 
Town planning’s initial naïve optimism, lack of developed theory and of 
adequate empirical analysis had finally found its nemesis and come full circle. 
The utter inadequacy of a modus operandi that ignored the need of collecting 
feedback, learning and adapting in the process of acting had been fully 
exposed. Cullingworth (1994, p. 290) significantly concluded that ‘there seems 
little doubt that in the perpetual planning conflict between flexibility and 
certainty, the former is the clear winner’. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Conflict is the gadfly of thought. 
…is a sine qua non of reflection and ingenuity. 
(Dewey, 1988, p. 207) 
 
Early sanitarians (like Chadwick) and early post-war planners showed 
exaggerated confidence in their broadly technical solutions. They attempted 
to force them on a reality in which these solutions did and could not fit. Their 
lack of concern for practical integration and continuous learning in action 
caused their failure. The next generation of public health advocates and town 
planners had to learn humility and the importance of practical reason and 
integration, of local knowledge, values and strategic judgement17. For town 
                                                        
17 John Simon—an important inspiration for the ideas developed in this paper—explicitly 
articulated this wisdom. In the preface to his English Sanitary Institutions (Simon, 1890), he 
clarified that that work was not meant to be a contribution to medical science, but to the very 
important task of promoting the welfare of the people. He explained that even within the context 
of that task ‘Medical Science is only joint-worker with other powers of knowledge and action for 
the national interests that are in question … In parts of the endeavour, it can work sufficiently 
well by itself; but in other parts, it eagerly looks around for allies’ (Simon, 1890, pp. vii-viii). In all 
the advances that promote better understanding, more ethical behaviour, more economic and 
organisational efficiency ‘the medical specialist gratefully recognises types of contribution, often 
not less necessary than his own, towards that great system of Preventive Medicine which is 
hoped for by Sanitary Reformers’ (p. viii). Simon understood that neither science nor politics can 
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planners the early mistake meant missing a unique window of opportunity 
and earning a poor reputation that they are still struggling to overcome (see 
Tewdwr-Jones, 1999; Ellis & Henderson, 2014, p. 4). 
  
Another lesson that emerges from the case studies is the importance of limits. 
The notion of limits applies at various levels. Seeing practical reason as the 
combination of general and local knowledge, instrumental rationality, 
phronesis and metis implies that each component taken alone is limited and 
cannot work properly but in combination with the others. Similarly values, 
institutions and knowledge need each other to work properly—they are 
necessary but not sufficient conditions for the exercise of collective practical 
reason. There is therefore a sense in which each of the elements of practical 
reason and of practical integration is limited and in need of being 
supplemented or integrated. Their limits call for complementarity. But this also 
means that they limit each other: the claims of each component are limited by 
those of the others. An ecological balance is necessarily a reciprocal limitation.  
 
Finally, the logic of integration itself needs to be limited: integration is not 
always an ideal process: I have stressed the need of trade-offs and pragmatic 
compromises that are unavoidable when operating in non-ideal conditions 
and aiming at action. Integration through reciprocal limitation requires that 
different demands, coming from different dimensions of the VIK triangle and 
from the plurality internal to each dimension, should be heeded and 
acknowledged even when they are not satisfied. We need to preserve a 
plurality of independent sources of legitimate and potentially conflicting 
demands, because we deal with complex and multidimensional problems. If 
pushed too far integration irons out necessary frictions that act as healthy 
checks and remainders of our shortcomings. Therefore, the demands of 
practical integration are pragmatically justified and do not call for epistemic 
rationalizations. Practical integration should not aim at obliterating ethical 
and epistemological conflicts: on the contrary such conflicts instruct us on the 
limits of our knowledge and actions. 
 
This view of integration is based on the assumption that the 
multidimensionality of social problems makes them complex, shifting, open-
ended and characterized by conflicting desiderata. They are not neat (‘tame’) 
problems with clear and ultimate technical solutions. They belong to the 
family of issues that have been variously described as ‘wicked problems’ 
                                                                                                                                                              
claim a privileged, dominant status, but that they can play either leading or supporting role 
depending on the task. 
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(Rittel and Webber, 1973), ‘messes’ (Ackoff, 1981), ‘adaptive’ problems 
(Heifetz, 2001), belonging to the ‘swamp’ (Schön, 1987) and involving 
conflicting perspectives on values (Rein, 1976; Schön & Rein, 1994)18. Hence 
they are issues for which ‘conclusive solutions are very rare’ (Head & Alford, 
2013: 2; cf. Bammer, 2012, ch. 34 and Brown et al., 2010), but that can 
nonetheless be handled so as to make them more tractable. Therefore in 
responding to Grand Challenges we should embrace humility: instead of the 
hubris of aiming at solutions, or techno-fixes; we should remember that these 
are problems that can seldom be solved, and that we should rather aim for 
intelligent, evolving problem-coping. We can set up networks and 
organisations that keep adapting as problems evolve, that keep improving 
our knowledge and understanding, that keep looking for responses to the 
needs and interests that have not yet been satisfied.  
 
However, we should notice a constitutive tension in the attempt to set up 
institutions capable of linking values, knowledge and action: the tension, as it 
were, between reinventing the wheel and fighting the last war. When values 
that have been accepted by public opinion and lessons that have been learned 
from previous policies are ingrained in existing institutions they acquire a 
sort of hegemonic inertia: they inform the ethos and praxis of expert agencies. 
Furthermore they create learning biases, which enable us to learn some things, 
but conceal other issues. When circumstances change substantially and social 
priorities and sensibilities shift, such inertia is a hindrance and blind spots are 
crippling. Overcoming this inertia without losing accumulated expertise is 
itself a Grand Challenge worthy of attention: the challenge of integrating the 
skills of acting here and now while looking forward, backward and sideways. 
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